Advanced postindustrialization generates numerous challenges for the European social model. Central among these challenges is the problem of addressing new risks associated with employment and skills of semi and unskilled workers. In this chapter, I assess the partisan basis of support for social policies that address the needs of these marginalized workers. I specifically consider the impacts of postindustrial cleavages among core constituencies of social democratic parties on the capacity of these parties to pursue inclusive social policies. I argue -and find support for in empirical analyses -that encompassing labor organization is the most important factor in strengthening the ability of left parties to build durable and electorally successful coalitions in support of outsider-friendly policies. I go beyond existing work on the topic by considering the full array of postindustrial cleavages and electoral challenges facing left parties, by more fully elaborating the logic of why encompassing labor organization is crucial, and by considering a more complete set of measures of outsider policies than extant work. I compare my arguments and findings to important new work that stresses coalition building and partisan politics but minimizes the role of class organization.
Introduction
Advanced postindustrialization generates numerous challenges for the European social model. Central among these is the rise of "new social risks" not well covered by core social insurance programs of the Twentieth Century welfare state. These risks include threats to income and job security for semi and low-skilled workers generated by skilled-biased technological change, globalization, and related forces as well as new socioeconomic pressures on households that seek to balance work and family commitments and meet the skill/knowledge challenges of the postindustrial economy. Those new risks associated with employment and skills, often analyzed through the lens of labor market dualism, has been the subject of intense study.
1 In addition, advanced postindustrialization creates pressures on the unity of the political coalitions that undergird the European social model; this chapter will pay particular attention to this contemporary political challenge.
Generally, the literature on dualization stresses the bifurcation of postindustrial labor markets between insiders (e.g., skilled industrial sector workers) and outsiders, namely, younger, female, immigrant and less skilled workers increasingly concentrated in the service sector and on the unemployment rolls. Significant differences in wages and income, the incidence of involuntary part-time employment, and access to social insurance, services, job training and education characterize the divergent conditions faced by insiders and outsiders (e.g., Rueda
2007; Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders, and Naczyk 2012; Swank 2014) .
1 See David Rueda (2005; for the first major analysis of the political ramifications of labor market dualism, especially the impacts on social democratic parties (see below for the specifics of this argument). See Emmenegger et al (2012) for analysis of major features of labor market dualism and summaries of the large social science literature of the topic.
In this chapter, I assess the partisan basis of support for social policies that address the needs of marginalized workers. Following contributors in the seminal work of Amingeon and Bonoli (2006) , I specifically consider the impacts of postindustrial cleavages among core constituencies of social democratic parties on the capacity of these parties to pursue inclusive social policies. (Indeed, one of the most important contributions of Klaus Armingeon has been to pioneer the study of the political consequences of the rise of new social risks.) I argue that encompassing labor organization is the most important factor in strengthening the ability of left parties to build durable and electorally successful coalitions in support of outsider-friendly policies. I go beyond existing work on the topic by considering the full array of postindustrial cleavages and attendant electoral challenges facing left parties, by more fully elaborating the logic of why encompassing labor organization is crucial, and by considering a more complete set of measures of social and labor market policies than extant work. In concluding, I compare my arguments and findings to "new politics of the welfare state" research as well as to important new work that stresses coalition building and partisan politics but minimizes the role of class organization.
An Overview of Labor Market Outsider Policies and Outcomes
I focus on three dimensions of public policy specifically oriented to ameliorating the economic hardships of labor market outsiders in the postindustrial labor market. The first two policies are directed toward income protection for low income households: average income replacement rates of unemployment compensation across single and two earner households at 50 percent of the average production worker earnings and minimum income protection for outsiders. Minimum income protection is the sum of means-tested cash assistance plus family services and housing subsidies averaged across single, lone-parent, and two-parent households as a percent of the average production worker's wage. Cameron 1978; Stephens 1979; contributors to Castles 1982; Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber, Reagan, and Stephens 1993) . 6 Yet, in the wake of 1970s and 1980s economic crises and postindustrialization, a group of scholars led by Paul Pierson (1994; 1996) Although lower-skilled blue collar workers have an interest in ALMP programs, they and the broader working class have a strong preference for maintenance or expansion of income protection through the programs of the "traditional" welfare state.
Second, scholars have argued that a new conflict has emerged among key constituent groups of left parties as a function of changes in postindustrial occupational structures. As mentioned above, David Rueda (2005; has argued that with respect to social democratic parties' constituencies, postindustrial labor markets increasingly consist of insiders (skilled industrial sector workers) and outsiders (younger, female, immigrant and less skilled workers increasingly concentrated in the service sector). Iversen and Soskice (2015a) make a similar point by noting that in the postindustrial production process, skilled and unskilled workersheretofore intertwined in the structure of industrial production and politically integrated in a progressive social democratic-led coalition -are increasingly separated and dispersed across enterprises and sectors.
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For Rueda, the interests of insiders are in the maintenance of employment protection and the moderation of taxation of labor income, while outsiders favor both income transfers for short-term security and active labor market programs for human capital development and, ultimately, secure employment. Rueda argues that in the absence of rises in unemployment and risks that threaten insiders, social democratic parties will maintain employment protection and moderate tax burdens but not increase transfers and active labor market programs (with their associated tax burdens) that enhance the incomes of outsiders. Third, Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) and Kitschelt and Rehm (2015) , among others, adopt a different perspective and stress that while economic conflicts still divide Left party constituencies, a strong univeralism-particularism dimension of cultural conflict creates additional, serious electoral dilemmas for social democrats. As noted, Left parties increasingly rely on the support of socio-cultural professions who work in education, health, and family and cultural services; these citizens prefer policies that promote an inclusive, multicultural, and participatory society. Yet, social democrats must balance policies for this constituency with those for blue collar wage earners who tend to favor exclusionary and traditionalist if not authoritarian socio-cultural policies.
- Figure First, union density is very important. As Hou (2009) and Iversen and Soskice (2015b) have noted, unions disseminate political information and provide forums for political discussion.
This, in turn, fosters a better understanding of material interests by members and the capacity of members to make informed political choices. Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) In addition, union centralization (that is, extensive control over political-economic strategies and behaviors of constituent unions by one or a few national peak associations) should reinforce the inclusiveness of relatively densely organized union movements. As Gordon (2015) has pointed out, highly centralized union movements have strong norms for the democratic representation of all constituent unions (including low-skilled unions) in peak association decision making. Moreover, centralized peak associations are more likely to promote coherence in norms and policy positions across the union movement crucial to the mitigation of cleavages, and the general disposition of such encompassing union peaks is to champion broad social justice goals (Hall 2017) .
The presence of unions within the state is also important. The integration of unions within policy-making forms (e.g., advisory boards and commissions) and administrative units in mature welfare states is not only likely to offer points of political leverage for the union movement (Swank 2002) , it is also likely to foster support for redistributive programs among trade unions. As Gordon (2015) argues, the presence of Ghent system union predominance in the administration of unemployment compensation, and to a lesser extent joint union-employer administration of broad social insurance programs, is likely to cultivate union support of these programs as a vehicle of union maintenance and recruitment of members.
In sum, key features of encompassing union organization should integrate the core postindustrial constituencies of left parties, foster broad commitments to social justice and inclusive policies, and otherwise facilitate social democratic parties' pursuit of policies that address the needs of outsiders. And, as foreshadowed in Walter Korpi's (1983) 
A Note on Employers Organization
I also account for employer organization. Specifically, Martin and Swank (2012) have pointed out that high levels of employers' organization cultivate a collective orientation to the long-run interests of employers (for instance, an interest in human capital). In addition, the repeated exchanges with labor and the state that occur at high levels of organization build trust, reciprocity and a commitment to the public interest among employers. These considerations, along with the tendency of highly organized employers to support social insurance that bolsters worker investment in specific skills, suggest that the greater the employer organization, the greater the social protection for outsider policies; Martin and Swank report clear evidence for this proposition in the case of ALMP.
An Empirical Analysis of the Partisan Basis of Outsider Policies and Outcomes
In the following analysis, I focus on the four dimensions of outsider policies and outcomes discussed above: low-wage worker unemployment benefits, means-tested income protection, ALMP, and reduction in relative poverty. I draw on the large literature of the determinants of social and labor market policies and outcomes and develop and estimate empirical models of variations across space and time in outsider policies and poverty reduction for 13 to 18 developed capitalist democracies (see Table 1 The organization of labor is measured as a standard score index of union density, a 0.0 to 4.0 scale of centralization of powers in the largest national peak association (control of affiliate appointments, over strikes, of bargaining strategy, and of conflict funds), and a 0.0 to 1.0 scale of integration of unions into public policymaking forums. Employer organization is measured through a standard score index of the presence of a national employers' peak association, 0.0 to 4.0 scale of powers of the peak (control of affiliate appointments, over lockouts, of bargaining 9 I measure the partisan control of government by weighting the ideological position of each governing party with that party's share of total governing parties' parliamentary (lower chamber) seats, and summing the score for all governing parties The ideological position of each party is based on the party's score on the 26-item scale of government intervention in markets and society developed in the Manifesto Data Collection project (Volkens et al 2013) . The resulting variable is scaled 0.0 to 100 (where 100 is the most left-leaning score possible). 10 In addition, I substituted the annual share of Left party cabinet portfolios, a common alternative measure of partisan government, and I note these very similar results below. Overall, measures of multicollinearity reveal the short-and intermediate term measures have low associations with the standard set of exogenous variables, including labor organization (e.g., R-squares of .1 to .4).
strategy, and of conflict funds), and 0.0 to 1.0 scale of policymaking integration of employers.
As to the economic position of the median citizen, I follow the conceptualization and measurement procedures of Lupu and Pontusson (2011) and use a ratio of ratios, or income skew: I compute the ratios of earners at the 90 th and 50 th percentiles and at the 50 th and 10 th percentiles. As suggested by theory, I use the ratio of these two numbers to capture relative closeness of median citizen/voter to low income earners.
As to globalization, I control for imports and exports of goods and services as percentage To assess the effects of partisan government across levels of union organization, I (Beck and Katz, 1996) . To assess robustness of results (and check for potential bias from unmodeled country or time effects), I re-estimate all models with fixed and random effects estimators. 
Findings
The results of the analysis of the partisan basis of income protections for low-wage earners are presented in Table 2 . As the table reveals, the general impact of left partisan government on unemployment benefit replacement rates and minimum income protection is indeed significant. In concrete terms, a shift, let's say, in partisan government of 25 points on the 100-point ideological scale would increase unemployment compensation replacement rates for low-wage workers by 2.8 percent (25 × .1111) and means-tested benefits (as a percentage of an average production worker's wage) by 4.5 percent (25 × .1809) . 12 This magnitude of partisan change would be, for instance, equivalent to a shift from a moderate center-right government to a moderate center-left one. In addition, it is important to note that the direct impact of labor 11 I do not use, for instance, a fixed effects estimator as my standard estimator because of the need to assess theoretically important variables with heavily cross-national variation (e.g., labor organization). In any case, fixed and random effects estimations reproduce the pattern of findings presented below. 12 Measures of party government over the previous five and 10 years produce modestly stronger findings than the three-year average score, I use the 10-year measure in all models as it proves slightly more robust than the five-year average.
organization on unemployment benefits for low income workers is substantively large and statistically significant; a one (standard deviation) unit increase in the index of labor organization (for instance, a move from the degree of 1980s labor organization in New Zealand to the level in the Netherlands) would, itself, increase income replacement rates by three and a half percent.
While positive, the substantive direct effect of union organization on minimum income protection is smaller and not significant at conventional levels.
- Table 2 about here-
The second and fourth columns of Table 2 present the results for the basic assessment of the core hypothesis of the chapter, namely, that Left government impacts on income protection for outsiders will differ across levels of labor organization. As the table suggests, the coefficient for the interaction between partisan government and labor organization is not significant for unemployment compensation; it is, however, clearly significant in the case of minimum income protection. Moreover, when one applies the advice of Kam and Franzese (2009) to the current context and examines marginal impacts of partisan government across specific levels of labor organization, it becomes clear that alternation in partisan governments has little impact on both types of outsider income protection when labor organization is low (e.g., Britain and the United States). Partisan impacts are, however, significant and substantively important for outsider policies at medium and high levels of labor organization. 13 For low wage unemployment benefits, the impact of a 25 point upward shift in party government ideological position at medium levels of union organization (e.g., the Netherlands) is 2.8; at high levels of union organization (e.g., Austria and Denmark) the replacement rate impact is 3.4 percentage points.
An identical pattern emerges with respect to minimum income protection benefits, and this is highlighted in Figure 2 . As labor organization rises, the effect of social democratic government increases in substantive magnitude and significancr. At high levels of union organization, benefits relative to median wages increase over seven percentage points under a left-leaning versus right-leaning government.
- Figure 2 about here-
The estimates of the effects of the models' other variables are presented in subsequent rows of Table 2 . While of secondary interest here, one might note the following findings: core features of globalization, trade and capital openness, bolster the level of unemployment benefits for low wage workers; globalization's impacts are also positive and near significant in the minimum income protection models. In addition, there are substantively large need effects. For unemployment benefits, slow economic growth is associated with relatively more generous support for low-wage workers; for minimum income protection, high unemployment is associated with more generous assistance. Finally, two additional findings might be mentioned:
employer organization is positively associated with both forms of outsider policy, but these effects are only significant for minimum income protection. Second, deindustrialization has a significant, negative impact on minimum income protection. One interpretation for this finding is that deindustrialization generally promotes the shift to an activation strategy and this, in turn, inherently entails reductions in the generosity of long-term income assistance for outsiders.
- Table 3 about here-
The results of the analysis of partisan and labor organization impacts on ALMP and poverty reduction are presented in Table 3 . As in the case of income protection for low income workers, left party government is associated with significantly higher AMLP spending and poverty reduction than under center-right governments. The direct impacts of party government are substantively important. As shown in the first column, a shift of 25 points in the ideological position of the government (for instance, a move from a center-right to center-left government) would shift ALMP spending by .1 (25×.0036). Given that mean ALMP spending as a percent of GDP is .8, this change in resource commitments for ALMP is not trivial. Similarly, a 25 point shift in government is associated with a 4 percent point increase (25× .1601) in pre-fisc to postfisc relative poverty reduction. The direct impacts of labor organization (first and third columns)
are also substantively important: ALMP spending and poverty reduction increase .1 and 3.7, respectively, for a one (standard deviation) unit change in labor organization.
With regard to the mediation of partisan government effects by labor organization, Table   3 illustrates that higher labor organization, as expected, intensifies the impact of party government on ALMP. For instance, at average levels of labor organization (0.0 on the standard score index), the impact of a one unit change in party government is .0031. 14 At moderately high labor organization (say a standard score index value of 1), the partisan government impact is .0081 (.0031+.0050×1.0). If we use a 25 point shift on the ideological position scale as the magnitude in change in party government, ALMP spending would increase by .1 at average levels and .2 at moderately high levels of labor organization with such a partisan change. On the other hand, the interaction between party government and labor organization is not significant in the poverty reduction model. Yet, recalling Kam and Franzese's (2009) suggestion, when we examine individual marginal effects of partisan government we do see important differences in party impacts across levels of labor organization: party alternation in power has no effect on the magnitude of poverty reduction at low levels of labor organization but substantively important ones at moderate and high amounts of labor organization (3.9 and 4.6 percent, respectively).
With respect to other factors in the model, three findings deserve note. Employers' organization has significant positive effects, as predicted by Martin and Swank (2012) , on ALMP; it is also significantly associated with poverty reduction in one of two models (and nearly so in the other). 15 Second, increases in international capital mobility are significantly related to ALMP spending, although international openness variables are not associated with poverty reduction. Finally, needs have substantial impacts on both ALMP and poverty reduction.
In the case ALMP, a drop in economic growth and a rise unemployment rates both significantly increase ALMP spending. For poverty reduction, an increase in unemployment has a large substantive effect on the magnitude of poverty reduction: a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate would, alone, increase poverty reduction by roughly 1.3 percent points. This paper also highlights the importance of the organization of producer interests to postindustrial welfare state politics. As Paul Pierson (2016) recently noted in a commentary on Beramendi et al's (2015) sweeping analytical assessment of trajectories of economic and social policy in advanced postindustrial capitalism, the role electoral politics, coalition building, and partisanship is central to the explanation of policy change; the role of class organization is not.
The arguments and findings presented here are both complementary to this recent work and implicitly critical of it. On the one hand, this paper's arguments and findings confirm the importance of electoral politics in shaping responses to the challenges of labor market dualism.
On the other hand, my findings diverge from Beramendi et al (2015) , Iversen and Soskice (2015a) , and others who minimize the importance of class organization in the contemporary periods. As this chapter shows, encompassing labor organization has a significant, substantively large direct effect on social policies for outsiders and, ultimately their relative economic status; labor organization also systematically mediates the capacity of partisan governments to adjudicate deep divisions between core constituencies and, in turn, pursue solidaristic policies that address the needs of outsiders. Moreover, as stressed by Martin and Swank (2004; , one must also recognize the importance of employer organization for some forms of inclusive social and labor market policy. This is especially the case in the area of ALMP; earlier evidence offered by Martin and Swank on the salience of employer organization is reinforced here with new analyses of ALMP that extend over a decade into the 21 st century.
In sum, the analysis and conclusions of this chapter reinforce the initial assessments of
Armingeon and collaborators as well as the array of like-minded scholars discussed above: the politics of new social risks, and especially the politics of inclusive social and labor market policy, is a story of the dynamics of coalition building in advanced postindustrial society, the continued importance partisan government, and the power of organized interests. This story is not unlike, in broad structural terms, the well-established narrative of the politics of 20 th century welfare state development. 
